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The central aim of this paper is to make the case for the obstinacy thesis.
This is the thesis that proper names like ‘Hitler’, demonstratives like ‘this’, pure
indexicals like ‘I’, and natural kind terms like ‘water’ and ‘gold’, are obstinately
rigid terms. An obstinately rigid term is one that refers to the object that is its
actual or present referent with respect to every possible world or time (hence, a
fortiori, even with respect to worlds or times where that object does not exist).
This form of rigidity is stronger than the usual Kripkean one and has been
notoriously explored by David Kaplan (Kaplan 1989a: 492–3; Kaplan 1989b:
569–71). Yet, the obstinacy thesis seems implausible to many philosophers and
is worth substantive argument. For convenience, we focus our attention on
proper names; but most of our remarks could be easily generalized to other
unstructured singular terms. We shall take for granted Saul Kripke’s semantical
view that proper names are rigid in the general sense of the term and argue that
their rigidity should take the specific form of obstinacy rather than persistence.
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part we consider what
seems to be one of the main objections to the obstinacy thesis, that it is
committed to the claim that it is possible to refer to non-existent objects,
particularly to merely possible individuals. We do not take up the issue whether
this claim is plausible but rather show that the objection is a non sequitur. Hence,
philosophers who want to take an actualist stand on singular reference can
happily endorse the obstinacy thesis (assuming they accept rigidity in general,
of course). In the second part of the paper we examine in detail two positive
arguments for the obstinacy thesis, the Argument from Existence and the
Argument from Time, the essentials of which are due to Kaplan and Nathan
Salmon. We also discuss and eventually dismiss as unsound some recent inter-
esting rejoinders to these arguments. Finally, in the third part we introduce a
significant consequence of the obstinacy thesis for the semantics of proper
names. We argue that if the thesis is true, then it will be possible to show on
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purely modal grounds that the doctrine of actualized descriptivism about names,
i.e. descriptivism backed up by descriptions rigidified by means of the actuality
operator, is false. We briefly mention a related epistemic argument against
actualized descriptivism, an argument that brings out differences in epistemic
modal status between sentences containing persistently rigid terms and corres-
ponding sentences containing obstinately rigid terms; it turns out that the
specific category of persistent descriptive terms invoked by that brand of
descriptivism gives rise to certain logical, and hence a priori, truths that are
clearly absent when the corresponding obstinate terms are considered.
If we restrict ourselves to weakly rigid terms in Kripke’s sense (see below),
then the general upshot of our discussion of obstinacy is that it allows us to
single out an important class of singular terms, those to which a certain notion
of unmediated reference is applicable. This notion can be roughly introduced as
follows with respect to a given term. Whatever reference-fixing mechanism
might be at work to secure a reference to the term in a given context of use, a
reference relative to the world of the context (the actual world), that mechanism
will not be at work to secure a reference to the term with respect to any
counterfactual situation. Once the term is assigned an object as its referent
with respect to the actual world, the reference-fixing mechanism (if any) employed
to the effect is not further activated to fix a reference for the term with respect to
any point of evaluation or possible world; indeed, the reference of the term will
invariably be that very object. Thus, whereas both non-rigid terms like ‘The nazi
dictator’ and persistently rigid ones like ‘The actual nazi dictator’ or ‘The off-
spring of gametes s and o’ only mediately refer, unmediated reference in the above
sense is the distinctive mark of obstinacy. Indexicals, whose reference-fixing
mechanisms are well known, nicely illustrate the semantic features of obstinacy
and unmediated reference. The same sort of characterization of the notion of
unmediated reference could be made with respect to times, instead of worlds, as
points of evaluation—or, better, with respect to pairs of worlds and times.2
If d is an obstinately rigid singular term, then the following sort of condi-
tional schema will be true of it; the schema builds upon a distinction that is
familiar from bi-dimensional semantics: the distinction between contexts of use
and circumstances of evaluation.
(B) If d, as used in context c* defined by world w* and time t*, refers to an
object a with respect to w* and t*, then d (as used in c*) will refer to a with
respect to any world w and time t.
Particular instances of schema (B) will be knowable a priori by competent users
of the terms involved: they will know them solely on the basis of their knowledge
of the general rule of reference for obstinate terms embodied in the conditional
schema. In contrast, if d is a persistently rigid singular term, then schema (B)
will not be true of it. Moreover, assuming that the term d as used in a context
refers to a certain object with respect to the world and time of the context, it will
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be known only a posteriori by a competent speaker whether or not the persistent
d (as used in the context) refers to any object with respect to an arbitrary world
or time; for knowing this will invariably involve knowing whether or not a
certain condition is satisfied by something available at the given world or time,
and this is surely empirical knowledge.
Scott Soames has recently claimed that the non-descriptionality of non-
descriptional terms is a more fundamental semantic feature of these terms than
their rigidity (Soames 2002: 264–6), where by ‘non-descriptionality’ he means
approximately what we mean by ‘unmediated reference’. We think that if the
rigidity in question is of the obstinate variety and if our considerations in favor
of it are sound, then the claim is wrong in the sense that rigidity and unmediated
reference should be seen as semantic notions located at the same conceptual
level: neither is prior to the other in the order of explanation.
1. Obstinacy and Reference to Non-Existents
Following Salmon (Salmon 1982: 33–4), let us distinguish as follows
between two species of rigid designation (where d is a singular term and a its
actual referent):
(a) Obstinate rigidity. d obstinately refers to a iff d refers to a with respect
to every possible world.
(b) Persistent rigidity. d persistently refers to a iff d refers to a with respect
to every possible world where a exists and refers to nothing with respect
to every other possible world.
According to the generic notion introduced by Kripke (Kripke 1980: 48–9), d is
a rigid designator of a iff d refers to a with respect to every possible world where
a exists; or, to avoid certain complications, one should rather define the notion
as follows: d is a rigid designator of a iff d refers to a with respect to every
possible world where a exists and to nothing other than a with respect to every
other possible world. The alluded complications arise from the fact that the
former definition does not preclude the possibility of a rigid term d referring to
an object b distinct from a with respect to some of the worlds where a does not
exist (see Williamson 1988).
If the object referred to a is a necessary existent then the designator d, if
rigid, will be a strongly rigid designator of a (to use Kripke’s phrase); hence, it
will be both an obstinately rigid and a persistently rigid designator of some such
object. Thus, the distinction between obstinacy and persistence only makes sense
if one assumes the modal contingency of existence, the claim that there are
objects, for instance concrete particulars, that only contingently exist; note that
this claim should be read as ‘It is not the case that everything necessarily exists’
(:"x&Ex). For the purposes of this paper I adopt the standard treatment of the
existence predicate in terms of existential quantification and identity; thus, a
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sentence of the form d exists (Ed) is defined as d is identical to something
(9x d=x). Semantically, the existence predicate behaves as a logical constant
in the sense that it is assigned a fixed semantic value from interpretation to
interpretation: its extension with respect to a possible world w will invariably
be the set of objects existing in w.
I am aware that the modal contingency of existence is not beyond dispute;
for one thing, Timothy Williamson has challenged it in a series of papers
(see e.g. Williamson 1998). Yet, I think we can safely assume it in the context
of the present discussion, as it seems to be a shared principle in the dispute
between proponents of and opponents to the obstinacy thesis. Indeed, the
very distinction between obstinacy and persistence would collapse if the non-
contingency of existence were endorsed: every rigid term would turn out to be
strongly rigid and so both obstinate and persistent. Therefore, I shall simply
take for granted the modal contingency thesis and assume henceforth that the
object of reference a is a contingent existent, something that exists but might not
have existed. There are two other important assumptions that we shall be using
and that should perhaps be explicitly stated from the outset. The first is that
quantifiers in the object language will be given their so-called ‘‘actualist’’ or
world-bound readings. This means that when a sentence governed by a quanti-
fier is evaluated with respect to a possible world the range of the quantified
variables is confined to objects that exist in the world in question; thus, the set of
objects existing in each world plays the role of domain of quantification. The
second assumption is that the set of existents is allowed to vary from possible
world to possible world; in particular, it will be assumed that some possible but
non-actual worlds will contain fewer things than the actual world, that there are
worlds where some actually existing things do not exist. I am also aware that
these assumptions are not wholly uncontroversial; but, again, I think we are
entitled to make them given the concerns of the present paper.
The prima facie problematic aspect of the obstinacy thesis concerns counter-
factual situations in which the object a does not exist, since the obstinate term d
is said to continue to refer to it relative to such situations. Accordingly, an
immediate reaction against the thesis consists in observing that it introduces an
intolerable divorce between notions that should be seen as inseparable: reference
to an object and existence of an object. The claim is that the obstinacy thesis
entails that it is possible to refer to non-existent objects; in particular, it entails
that it is possible to refer to mere possibilia, objects that do not exist but might
have existed. This claim seems to be pervasive in the philosophical literature
about rigidity; for example, one can find it in papers by Robert Steinman
(Steinman 1985) and Jason Stanley (Stanley 1997). The fact that leading
proponents of obstinacy like Kaplan and Salmon also subscribe to the doctrine
that one can refer to mere possibilia may help explain in part such pervasiveness.
Anyway, those who believe that one can refer only to what exists, perhaps in
virtue of believing that reference invariably requires in the end some sort of
causal interaction, will rate the obstinacy thesis as false on that basis.
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Assuming that there is no quarrel about the rigidity of names in general, it
seems that the central reason for favoring persistent rigidity over obstinate
rigidity is that the latter but not the former involves naming the non-existent:
we are forced to count situations in which the bearer of a name is not available
as situations relative to which we are nonetheless able to refer to it by using the
name. Thus, the crucial question to be answered in this respect is this. How
should we treat rigid terms relative to possible situations where the correspond-
ing objects are not available? The proponent of persistence argues that we
should definitely treat them as non-denoting terms, on a par with paradigmatic
vacuous names like ‘Vulcan’ or ‘Pegasus’ and improper descriptions like ‘The
10th planet of the solar system’ or (presumably) ‘The possible fat man on the
doorway’; otherwise we would have to go obstinate and then we would have to
treat those terms as denoting non-existent objects.
However, despite appearances to the contrary, there is no entailment from
obstinacy to reference to mere possibilia and the objection is misplaced. This can
be checked by means of a careful employment of Kaplan’s well-known apparatus
of contexts of use and circumstances of evaluation. The bi-dimensional frame-
work for reference contained therein, on which the notions of reference with
respect to a world and reference in a world are sharply distinguished, provides
us with an effective way of dissipating the confusion. The former notion
concerns the reference of words as used by us in describing certain counter-
factual situations; the latter concerns the reference of words as used in those
counterfactual situations. Note that two kinds of possible world may be
involved here, since the world that plays the role of context of use and the
world that plays the role of circumstance of evaluation are not necessarily one
and the same. Indeed, in cases of reference by means of obstinate terms we
arguably have two kinds of world at work. One is a generation world, a world
where reference is generated. This is the world of the context of our uses of a
name, by default the actual world; ex hypothesi the objects obstinately referred
to by those uses of the name exist there. The other is a target world, a counter-
factual situation described in some of our uses of the name. The objects
obstinately referred to might not exist there, but that does not prevent them
from being referred to in those uses.
The difference between the two parameters can be approximately captured
by means of the following schema
(S) d as used in w* refers to a with respect to w,
where the letter d is (as before) replaceable by names of English singular terms,
w* by designators of generation worlds, and w by designators of target worlds.
This allows us to characterize cases of obstinately rigid reference as those that
can satisfy the following schema:
(O) d as used in w* refers to a with respect to w and a does not exist in w.
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Naturally, the worlds w* and w may be distinct and so instances of schema (O)
are consistent with instances of schema
(T) d as used in w* refers to a with respect to w* and a exists in w*,
where generation and target worlds are made to coincide. Taking w* as the
actual world, this means that the obstinate term d actually refers to an actually
existent object, that is to say, to an object that exists in the generation world.
True modal sentences such as
(1) Hitler might not have been born
give us straightforward illustrations of how the bi-dimensional apparatus is to
be applied to the obstinacy cases. The target world is here the situation where
Hitler does not exist, the world described by the modalized sentence. But relative
to that world the name ‘Hitler’, as used in the generation world (the actual
world, the world at which sentence (1) is evaluated as true), still refers to Hitler.
Obviously, the presumption is that, as used in the generation world, the name
‘Hitler’ refers with respect to such a world to someone, namely Hitler, who exists
there.
In sharp contrast to the obstinacy cases are cases of reference to non-
existent objects, most notably cases of reference to merely possible individuals.
Assuming for the sake of argument that there really are such cases, we could
characterize them as those that can satisfy a different schema, namely the
following one:
(P) d as used in w* refers to a with respect to w* and a does not exist in w*
(where generation and target worlds coincide). Here the term, as used in the
generation world, refers to some object relative to that world; yet, the object in
question does not exist in the generation world, but presumably exists in some
non-actual world.
A proper name such as Salmon’s ‘Noman’ would be a case in point, a case
in which one can allegedly name the non-existent (Salmon 1987: 49–50).
The name ‘Noman’ is supposed to have been introduced into the language by
having its reference fixed by means of some such definite description as
‘The person who would have resulted from the union of ovum o and sperm
cell s had s fertilized o’, where ovum o and sperm cell s are actually available
but, as things really stand, o has never been fertilized by s. True modal sentences
such as
(2) Noman might have been born
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give us straightforward illustrations of how the bi-dimensional apparatus is to
be applied to cases of reference to mere possibilia. More important, the appar-
atus teaches us how not to conflate such cases and cases of obstinate reference.
The generation world—the actual world, the world at which sentence (2) is
evaluated as true—is a situation where Noman does not exist but relative to
which the name ‘Noman’, as used there, refers to Noman; the target world—the
world described by the modalized sentence—is a situation in which Noman
exists and also a situation relative to which the name ‘Noman’, as used in the
generation world, refers to Noman.
Therefore, cases of obstinate reference are cases in which terms actually
refer to things that actually exist, whereas cases of reference to mere possibilia
are cases in which terms actually refer to things that actually do not exist. The
erroneous assimilation of such disparate types of case may be seen as arising
from an erroneous reading of sentences of the form d refers to a with respect to w
as meaning If d were used in w, then d would refer to a. Thus, a sentence such as
‘‘Hitler’ refers to Hitler relative to possible situation s’ is misread as ‘If ‘Hitler’
were used in s, then ‘Hitler’ would refer to Hitler’. Assuming that Hitler does not
exist in s, it would follow that the name would be used in s to refer to a non-
existent person; but this is wrong, as it stems from confusion between generation
world and target world. To sum up, the obstinacy thesis does not involve any
reference to what does not exist; a fortiori, it does not involve any reference to
what does not exist but might have existed. Rather, it only involves a reference
to what exists but might not have existed. (Notice that in order to deal with the
issue about obstinate rigidity we need not take a stand on the surely important
issue of whether there are mere possibilia, or whether these can be genuine
objects of reference; these issues are clearly independent and it is important to
keep them apart.)
2. Arguments for the Obstinacy Thesis
Of course, removing what is perhaps the motivation for rejecting the obstin-
acy thesis is not tantamount to establishing it. So we would better have some
positive arguments for the thesis. We shall now introduce, discuss, and even-
tually endorse reconstructed versions of two familiar arguments to the effect.
These arguments have been put forward first by Kaplan and then by Salmon
(see Kaplan 1989a: 492–3 and Salmon 1989: 37–9). However, it should be
observed that, unlike Kaplan’s original arguments, the versions we are about
to introduce do not invoke at any point the thesis that indexicals, proper names,
and other syntactically simple terms are directly referential terms, a thesis from
which their obstinacy, as well as the associated idea of unmediated modal
reference, would follow (at least if the thesis is read as below). The direct
reference thesis is a very strong thesis about content; in a familiar formulation
it asserts that the sole contribution of a name or indexical to determining the
semantic content in a given context of a sentence containing it is the object
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(if any) referred to by the name or indexical in the context in question. We think
that neither the direct reference view nor any other substantive view about
semantic content is strictly needed in running an adequate argument for the
obstinacy thesis.
We begin with the Argument from Existence:
The Argument from Existence
Premise A: Let n be a proper name whose actual referent is a contingent existent
a and w a world where a does not exist. Then a negative existential sentence
containing n in the subject position, a sentence of the form n does not exist, will
be true with respect to w.
Premise B: The sentence n does not exist is true with respect to w only if n refers
to a with respect to w.
Conclusion: n is an obstinately rigid designator of a. (It is assumed that n is
rigid and thus refers to a with respect to any world where a exists.)
The crucial premise of the argument is, of course, Premise B. A way of
arguing for Premise B is this. It is well supported by the intuition that in
employing a modal sentence such as ‘Hitler might not have existed’ to describe
a certain situation as possible we are referring to Hitler by means of our use of
the name ‘Hitler’, even though by definition the man does not exist in the
situation so described. Underlying Premise B is the correct idea of taking a
sentence such as ‘Hitler exists’ at face value, that is to say, to treat it exactly like
one treats any common first-order monadic predication such as ‘Hitler flies’,
and to treat its negation ‘Hitler does not exist’ exactly like one treats ‘Hitler does
not fly’. Hence, just as the sentence ‘Hitler does not fly’ is true at a world w iff
the predicate ‘flies’ does not apply in w to the individual referred to by the name
‘Hitler’ with respect to w, so the sentence ‘Hitler does not exist’ is true at w iff
the predicate ‘exists’ does not apply in w to the individual referred to by the
name ‘Hitler’ with respect to w. Assuming that the sentence ‘Hitler does not
exist’ is true at any world where Hitler does not exist (the hardly disputable
Premise A), the individual referred to by ‘Hitler’ with respect to w can only be
Hitler; for ex hypothesi Hitler does not satisfy the predicate ‘exists’ in w.
Yet, consider the following rejoinder to the Argument from Existence, a
rejoinder due to Stanley (Stanley 1997: 567). Grant Premise A of the argument
but focus on Premise B and on the dilemma it allegedly contains: either ‘Hitler
does not exist’ is not true at a world where Hitler does not exist, in which case
the sentence would not be assigned a truth-value (for it would not make sense to
count it as false either), or else the name ‘Hitler’ refers to Hitler with respect to
that world. Assuming that the option contained in the first horn of the dilemma,
the truth-value gap option, is inadequate, Stanley claims that we are facing a
false dilemma since there is a satisfactory way out. There is another way of
accommodating the truth of the existential negative and conciliating it with
the claim that ‘Hitler’ does not designate Hitler with respect to the world in
8 / João Branquinho
question (for the simple reason that it does not designate anything there). The
proposed way out springs from the policy, typically adopted by some free logics,
to count as false any atomic sentence whose subject position is occupied by an
empty proper name. Hence, just as a sentence like ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is deemed
false relative to the way things actually are, and hence its negation ‘Vulcan is
not a planet’ comes out as true at the actual world, so our atomic monadic
predication ‘Hitler exists’ is deemed false at a world with respect to which
‘Hitler’ does not refer to anything (because Hitler does not exist there); so its
negation ‘Hitler does not exist’ comes out as true at that world. Notice that these
negations should be taken as external (or wide-scope) rather than internal; in
other words, such sentences should be seen as having the form :(Fn) rather than
the form (:F)n. Therefore, Premise B is false, proper names are only persistently
rigid, and the Argument from Existence is unsound.
Although ingenious, this rejoinder is unconvincing. We subsequently
explore a few lines of reply to it.
First and foremost, the rejoinder assumes that uses of names in sentences
employed to describe possible situations where their usual bearers do not exist
are uses in which the names should be considered as vacuous or non-denoting
terms. This assumption is needed to legitimize the application to those sentences
of the evaluation procedure taken from the appropriate free logics. Yet, we think
the assumption is mistaken. To see why, let us begin by asking the following
question. Why are the names so used to be regarded as non-denoting? Well,
because there is nothing in the described possible situations for them to denote.
But why is this so? Well, it seems that the answer rests on a mistaken assimilation
of the notion of reference relative to a world to the notion of reference in a world,
on a clearly fallacious move from claims of the form n would not refer to anything
if it were used in situation w to claims of the form n does not refer to anything with
respect to w. It is wrongly claimed that there is nothing in the described situations
for the names to denote because they would be denotationless if used in such
situations.
Again, the bi-dimensional semantic framework of contexts of use and
circumstances of evaluation turns out to be a crucial tool in the clarification
of the issue. There is a manifest difference between the case of names like
‘Pegasus’ and ‘Vulcan’ (taken as used by us), names that do not refer to any-
thing with respect to the actual world, and the case of names like ‘Bucephalus’
and ‘Mars’ (taken as used by us); these refer indeed to something with respect to
the actual world, although they may be employed by us to introduce counter-
factual situations in which their actual referents do not exist. In the former case
a name does not designate anything with respect to the generation world, the
world of the context; there is just no object to go along. In the latter case a name
designates something with respect to the generation world, but that something
might not exist in some target worlds; yet, if obstinacy holds, the object might
still be referred to by the name as used by us with respect to those target
worlds. Anyway, the policy inspired in free logic is not necessarily transferable
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from the first sort of case to the second sort of case; nothing prevents us then
from counting names of the latter kind as non-vacuous relative to any possible
world.
A second line of reply to Stanley’s rejoinder is based on simplicity reasons.
We think that obstinate rigidity is preferable to the alternative treatment
proposed in the rejoinder because it simplifies immensely the semantics for
monadic predications containing proper names or other syntactically simple
terms (of course, the point generalizes to predications of any degree). Although
considerations based on simplicity are hardly conclusive, we think they help
making the case for obstinacy. Let Fn be an arbitrary monadic predication.
Obstinacy allows us to give modal truth-conditions for it by means of the
following very simple and familiar rule:
(c) Fn is true at a world w iff the object referred to by n with respect to w
belongs to the extension of F relative to w.
It is irrelevant whether F is a simple or a complex predicate, whether or not F is
built from some predicate or predicates by means of some sentential operator.
Just as it is not required that the object referred to by a name with respect to a
world exist in that world, so it is not required, at least if we have in mind the
usual Kripke semantics for modal languages (Kripke 1963, Forbes 1989), that
the extension of a predicate relative to a world contain only objects existing in
that world. Predicates such as ‘is dead’ or the complement of the existence
predicate, the predicate ‘does not exist’, illustrate the remark. Besides, the
claim that some predicates may be true of non-existents seems to follow from
the obstinacy thesis: a predicate such as ‘is referred to by ‘Hitler’’ holds of Hitler
relative to a world where Hitler does not exist. The idea that some predicates can
hold of non-existents might seem implausible to some people. Yet, I think one
could perhaps mitigate such implausibility by employing the bi-dimensional
framework in the area of predication as well and distinguishing between the
notion of a predicate applying to something with respect to a possible world and
the notion of a predicate applying to something in a possible world; it might
then be argued that only the latter notion should be seen as existence-entailing.
In any case, on the obstinacy view there is just one way in which a monadic
predication could be false at a world w: when the object referred to by the
component name with respect to w (whether or not it exists in w) does not
belong to the extension of the predicate relative to w. This can happen even
when the object referred to does not exist, for example when the predicate is
‘exists’ or ‘is alive’. A sentence like ‘Hitler is alive’ is thus false at a world where
Hitler does not exist, because the individual referred to relative to that world
does not belong to the extension of ‘is alive’ relative to such world, which
contains only individuals that exist there.
In contrast, the semantics for monadic predications gets more complicated
on the alternative account, if one sees names and other simple terms as only
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persistently rigid. Modal truth-conditions for sentences of the form Fn would be
naturally given by means of rules of the following sort:
(d) Fn is true at a world w iff there is in w some object y such that y is the
object referred to by n with respect to w and y belongs to the extension
of F relative to w.
Here it is required that the object referred to by a name relative to a world exist
in that world: no object, no reference; and, if only for symmetry reasons, it
would be natural to require also that the extension of a predicate with respect to
a world contain only existents in that world: no object, no predication. Cases
in which F is superficially a complex predicate, most notably the complement
of the existence predicate, would have to be handled on the basis of scope
distinctions, most notably distinctions between external and internal negations;
as a result, not every sentence where n appears to occur in the subject position
would be counted as being of the form Fn and as being apt for an application of
rule (d). In any case, on the persistence view there would be two ways in which
a monadic predication could be false at a world w: either when there is no object
referred to by the component name relative to w (because it does not exist there);
or else when there is such an object but it does not belong to the extension of the
component predicate relative to w. The sentence ‘Hitler is alive’ is also evaluated
as false at a world where Hitler does no exist, but only because the name is taken
as non-referring relative to that world.
Furthermore, the account of proper names as persistently rigid designators
brings unnecessary complications to the semantics of identity sentences. On the
persistence approach every sentence of the form n is identical to n, where n is
replaceable by any non-empty name, would turn out to be contingently true.
Assuming such sentences to be atomic, they would be evaluated as false at possible
worlds where the object actually referred to by the name does not exist. Thus, the
sentence ‘Hitler is identical to Hitler’ would be evaluated as false at worlds where
Hitler does not exist, since ‘Hitler’ is supposed to be non-denoting with respect to
such worlds; hence, ‘Hitler is not identical to Hitler’ would be evaluated as true at
the worlds in question, the negation being again taken as external, and so the
sentence ‘Hitler might not have been Hitler’ would be evaluated as true at the
actual world. Of course, there surely are moves that the persistence theorist could
make to mitigate such results; for instance, she could employ a notion of weak
necessity and claim that every identity sentence of the above form is still necessar-
ily true, but in the weak sense of necessity. Nevertheless, we think this would bring
unnecessary complications to the semantics, complications that could be avoided
if only obstinacy were assumed. On the obstinacy approach every sentence of the
form n is identical to n, where n is replaceable by any non-empty name, is
necessarily true without any qualification (as one should expect).3
Finally, it is a well-known fact that predicates, or at least natural language
predicates, do not wear logical simplicity or complexity on their faces. It is not
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always clear whether a given predicate is primitive in the sense of not being
further analyzable in terms of other predicates, the sense in which a predicate
such as ‘bachelor’ is not primitive. Yet, on the persistence approach the require-
ment of logical simplicity needs to be met in order for us to be able to count a
given sentence as atomic and apply to it the evaluation procedure taken from
free logic. Consider a sentence like ‘Blair committed suicide’ taken as describing
a possible situation and a time in the recent past where Blair killed himself; or,
equivalently, consider a tensed modal sentence like ‘Blair might have just
committed suicide’ taken as evaluated at the actual world and the present
time. It is not clear how the predicate ‘committed suicide’ should be analyzed
so as to avoid our rating as false both the simple sentence with respect to that
situation and time and the modal tensed sentence with respect to the actual
world and the present time.
We move now to the second of our arguments for the obstinacy thesis, the
Argument from Time. This is essentially an indirect argument, an argument
by analogy that exploits the widely recognized structural similarity between
modality and tense.
We begin by introducing tense analogues of the two species of modal
rigidity discussed so far. Let d be a singular term and a its referent with respect
to a time t* (one may think of t* as the present moment). Then we can
distinguish as follows between two species of temporal rigidity:
(e) Temporal obstinacy. d obstinately refers to a iff d refers to a with
respect to every time t.
(f) Temporal persistence. d persistently refers to a iff d refers to a with
respect to every time t at which a exists and refers to nothing
with respect to every other time.
Here the time t is prior, equal, or posterior to t*. According to the generic
notion of temporal rigidity, d is a rigid designator of a iff d refers to a with
respect to every time t at which a exists; or, to avoid certain complications, one
should rather say that d is a rigid designator of a iff d refers to a with respect to
every time t at which a exists and to nothing other than a with respect to every
other time. By analogy with the modal case, the alluded complications arise
from the fact that the former definition does not preclude the possibility of a
rigid term d referring to an object b distinct from a with respect to some of the
times at which a does not exist.
It is worth observing that the view that proper names are temporally rigid in
this sense can already be found in Peter Geach’s writings, particularly in his
book Reference and Generality (see Geach 1976: 29–30). Geach seems even to
endorse the obstinate form of temporal rigidity when he argues that a sentence
such as ‘Dion is dead’ could not be true at a given time unless the name ‘Dion’
refers to Dion with respect to that time. Indeed, this argument is nothing but
a tense counterpart of the argument for modal obstinacy we discussed earlier on.
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If the object referred to a is an eternal existent then the designator d, if rigid,
will be a strongly rigid designator of a in the temporal sense; hence, it will be
both a temporally obstinate and a temporally persistent designator of some such
object. Thus, the distinction between obstinacy and persistence only makes sense
if one assumes the contingency of existence with respect to time as well, the
claim that there are objects, for instance concrete particulars, that only
temporarily exist, that do not exist at all times; this claim should be read as ‘It
is not the case that everything always exists’ (:"x&TEx, where &T is the tense
counterpart of the necessity operator). I am aware that the temporal contin-
gency of existence is not beyond dispute. Yet, for basically the same reasons as
before, I think we are entitled to assume it in the context of the present
discussion. Accordingly, I assume henceforth that the object of reference a is
a contingent existent, in the sense of something that exists at some but not at all
times.
The obstinacy thesis with respect to tense is thus the thesis that proper
names, indexicals, and other syntactically simple terms are temporally obstinate:
once assigned an object a as their referent on an occasion, they will refer to a on
any occasion, past or future; hence, they will refer to a even relative to those
occasions at which a does not exist. The Argument from Time runs as follows
(think of t* as the present time and of w* as the actual world):
The Argument from Time
Premise C: Proper names are temporally obstinate: if n is a proper name whose
referent relative to a given time t* is a contingent existent a, then n will refer to a
relative to every time t.
Conclusion: By analogy, proper names are modally obstinate: if n is a proper
name whose referent relative to a given world w* is a contingent existent a, then
n will refer to a relative to every world w.
Assuming that the analogy between modality and tense holds in this case, the
crux of the argument is, of course, Premise C. But Premise C is highly plausible.
It is well supported by the intuition that in employing sentences such as
(3) Kripke was not born yet in 1940
and
(4) Kripke will still be very influential in 2050
to describe a certain past or future situation, we are referring to Kripke by
means of our use of the name ‘Kripke’, even though by definition the man does
not exist in the situation so described. The central idea underlying the Argument
from Time is then the following. To the extent that the temporal obstinacy of
proper names is problematic, to that very extent the modal obstinacy of proper
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names will be problematic. But, as shown by examples such as the ones above,
there is nothing problematic about the temporal obstinacy of names. Therefore,
there is nothing problematic about their modal obstinacy either.
However, like its modal analogue, the temporal obstinacy thesis has been
challenged. Consider the following line of criticism developed again by Stanley
(Stanley 1997: 567). Stanley begins by crediting his obstinate opponent with the
claim that sentences such as
(5) Aristotle is currently the most-read philosopher
(6) John remembers Nixon,
taken as used (say) in 2003, support the thesis that proper names such as
‘Aristotle’ and ‘Nixon’ are temporally obstinate. Then he goes on to argue
that sentences of this kind, which involve a reference to past objects with respect
to the time of evaluation of the sentences, objects that no longer exist at that
time, are not the correct tense analogues of sentences that apparently support
the thesis of modal obstinacy. According to Stanley, the right analogues would
be given in sentences that involve rather a reference to future objects with
respect to the time of evaluation, objects that do not exist yet at that time.
One of these sentences would be
(7) Sally will be a female,
taken as uttered in 2003. Here the name ‘Sally’ is supposed to have been
introduced into the language by having its reference fixed by some such descrip-
tion as ‘The first child born in the twenty-second century’. As Stanley finds
dubious such cases of apparent reference to future individuals, for they allegedly
collide with the open nature of the future, he concludes that Premise C of the
Argument from Time remains unsupported.
Nevertheless, Stanley’s rejoinder is unconvincing. The reason is that it
arguably misdescribes what is involved in cases of temporal obstinacy. The
mistake has basically the same origin as the one about cases of modal obstinacy.
In effect, one can show that the thesis that names are temporally obstinate
entails neither that it is possible to name past individuals nor that it is possible
to name future individuals; hence, neither sentences like (5), or (6), nor sentences
like (7) are really needed to support the thesis. Rather, the examples that are
appropriate to the effect are sentences such as (3) and (4) above, taken as
presently used by us. There are in these examples two kinds of time to be
considered. On the one hand, there is the time of the context of use of the
sentences, which is by default the present moment and relative to which the
name gets its reference: the individual Kripke exists at that time. On the other,
there are the times, located in the past or in the future, that characterize the
situations described by means of the sentences: the individual Kripke does not
exist at those times. The thesis of temporal obstinacy is just the rather plausible
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claim that a name like ‘Kripke’ continues to designate its present referent even
with respect to past or future times at which that individual does not exist.
Temporally obstinate reference is thus present reference to presently exist-
ing objects relative to times where they do not exist, whereas reference to past
objects is present reference to objects that no longer exist, and reference to
future objects is present reference to objects that do not exist yet. Cases of
temporal obstinacy can be characterized as those that satisfy the following
schema:
(O)* d as used at t* refers to a relative to t and a does not exist at t
(where t* is the time of utterance and t the time of evaluation of the component
sentences, a time prior or subsequent to t*); whereas cases of reference to past or
future objects can be characterized as those that satisfy the different schema:
(P)* d as used at t* refers to a relative to t* and a does not exist at t*,
where the object a exists at some time prior to t*, in which case it is a past object,
or at some time subsequent to t*, in which case it is a future object.
The erroneous assimilation of such disparate types of case may be seen as
arising from an erroneous reading of sentences of the form d refers to a with
respect to t as meaning If d were used at t, then d would refer to a. Thus, a
sentence such as ‘’Dion’ refers to Dion relative to time t’ is misread as ‘If ‘Dion’
were used in t, then ‘Dion’ would refer to Dion’. Assuming that Dion does not
exist at t, it would follow that the name would be used at t to refer to a past or
future person; but this is wrong, as it stems from confusion between generation
time and target time. To sum up, the temporal obstinacy thesis does not involve
any reference to what does not presently exist; a fortiori, it does not involve any
reference to what no longer exists or to what does not exist yet. Rather, it only
involves a reference to what presently exists but did not in the past or will not
in the future.4 On the other hand, it seems clear that the treatment of names
and indexicals as persistently rigid gives manifestly wrong results when applied
to the temporal case.
3. Obstinacy and Actualized Descriptivism
We now discuss an important aspect of the import of the obstinacy thesis to
the semantics of proper names. Let Actualized Descriptivism be defined by the
following thesis:
(R) For every name n, for every competent user f of n, and for every use of
n by f in a context c, there is some singular definite description of the
form The actual F such that: (a) f associates The actual F with n in c;
and (b) the meaning of n in c is the meaning of The actual F in c, the
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reference of n in c being determined to be an object a iff The actual F
denotes a in c.
Actualized Descriptivism is thus a view about both the meaning and the refer-
ence of proper names. Versions of the view have been propounded by Alvin
Plantinga, Leonard Linsky, John Searle, and others (see Plantinga 1978, Linsky
1977, and Searle 1983: 255–8). More recently, Stanley has argued that the
doctrine is far from having been refuted (Stanley 1997). It is widely believed
that, contrary to what happens with more naı̈ve versions of descriptivism, Actual-
ised Descriptivism is immune to the usual Kripkean modal arguments, especially
the Rigidity Argument and the Unwanted Necessities Argument (see Devitt
and Sterelny 1999: 51–2). This alleged immunity has led many opponents to
descriptivism to have general doubts about the strength of modal arguments
and to prefer so-called semantic arguments such as the arguments from ignorance
and error set up by Kripke (e.g. the famous Gödel-Schmidt argument; see Kripke
1980: 83–92), Hilary Putnam (Putnam 1975), and Keith Donnellan (Donnelan
1972). The semantic arguments are seen by many people as the only ones that are
definitely capable of undermining descriptivism as a theory of reference for proper
names, as a general account of the way names get their reference, and so as
indirectly undermining descriptivism as a theory of meaning.
Yet, I think a rehabilitation of modal anti-descriptivism is both desirable and
something that can be achieved. A similar line of thought can be found in recent
work by Soames (Soames 1998), where modally orientated arguments against
descriptivism, especially the version known as wide-scope descriptivism, are
adduced. Following a suggestion made by Salmon (Salmon 1982: 35), I want to
argue in a similar vein thatActualizedDescriptivism is undermined if we hold to the
obstinacy thesis. Of course, further assumptions are needed to the effect; but these
are assumptions that aproponent of thatbrandof descriptivismwouldhardly reject.
Here is in outline a modal argument against Actualized Descriptivism in
which the obstinacy thesis is employed as a premise.
The Obstinacy Argument
Premise 1: Proper names are obstinate. Let n be a proper name and a its actual
referent. Then n refers to a with respect to every possible world. Hence, the
name ‘Hitler’ (as used by us) will refer to Hitler relative to all possible worlds,
including those where Hitler does not exist.
Premise 2: The actualized descriptions allegedly associated by competent
speakers with proper names are not obstinate. They are rigid but only persist-
ently rigid. Let D be an actualized description and a its denotation with respect
to the actual world. Then D will refer to a relative to every possible world where
a exists, but it will refer to nothing with respect to worlds where a does not exist.
Hence, the description ‘The actual nazi dictator’ (as used by us) will refer to
Hitler relative to worlds where Hitler exists, but will refer to no one relative to
worlds where Hitler does not exist.
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Premise 3: Rigidity properties are semantic properties that are determined by
meaning or content properties in the following sense: any difference relative to
properties of the former kind will entail some difference relative to properties of
the latter kind
Conclusion: The meaning of a proper name n is not the meaning of an actua-
lized description D.
Premise 2 is supported by the treatment usually given in possible world
semantics to singular definite descriptions (taken in attributive uses) and to the
actuality operator. By ‘actualised descriptions’ we mean terms obtained from
available definite descriptions by prefixing the actuality operator, the one-place
sentential operator A, to the component open sentences. Thus, given a descrip-
tion of the form The F or The x:Fx (ixFx), the resulting actualised description
will have the form The actual F or The x: Actually, Fx (ixAFx). This process has
the important semantic effect of converting descriptions that refer non-rigidly to
certain objects into rigid designators of these objects. The basic semantic fact
about the actuality operator is captured by the following rule for evaluating
sentences governed by it (s is any sentence):
(U) A sentence of the form As is true at a possible world w iff s is true at
world w*;
here w* is the world singled out to play the role of actual world. On the other
hand, the basic semantic fact about singular definite descriptions and their
denotations with respect to possible worlds is captured by the following rule
of reference:
(V) Given a description The x:Fx and a possible world w, if there is in w an
object a that uniquely satisfies the open sentence Fx with respect to w,
then the description The x:Fx will denote a with respect to w; other-
wise, the description will denote nothing with respect to w.
Putting rules (U) and (V) together we obtain the following rule of reference for
actualised descriptions:
(V)* Given a description The x:AFx and a possible world w, if there is in w
an object a that uniquely satisfies the open sentence Fx with respect to
the actual world w*, then the description The x:AFx will denote a
with respect to w; otherwise, the description will denote nothing with
respect to w.
The crucial point here is that a definite description will denote an object with
respect to a world only if that object is among the existents of the world in
question. Remember that the set of existents in a world is taken as the domain of
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quantification, the set from which the values of the variable x inAFx are drawn.
Actualized descriptions are thus surely rigid, for they will denote their actual
referents with respect to every world where they exist; but they are persistently
rigid, for they will denote nothing with respect to those worlds where their
actual referents do not exist.
One might think that true sentences such as the ones below provide us with
evidence that premise 2 is false:
The present President of the United States of America will be dead in
50 years
The actual President of the United States of America might have never
been born
Indeed, it seems that the rigidified descriptions occurring in such sentences are
behaving as obstinately rigid designators, i.e. as denoting George W. Bush with
respect to worlds and times where he does not exist. However, this is a mistake
since it involves selecting the wrong world or time as the world or time of
evaluation. Take the tensed sentence, for instance. It is ambiguous between a
wide-scope reading of the description, which could be crudely given as
Concerning the present President of the United States of America, the following
will be the case in 50 years: he is dead,
and a narrow-scope reading, which could be crudely given as
The following will be the case in 50 years: the present President of the United
State of America is dead.
In the former case, the time of evaluation, the time with respect to which the
description is to be assigned a reference (if any), is the present time, the time of
the context of use. Thus, the rigidified description denotes George W. Bush
relative to that time; but this is not a case of obstinacy for the man exists at the
time in question. In the latter case, the time of evaluation is a certain time in the
future. Yet, if we apply rule of reference (V) to this case then, assuming George
W. Bush is no longer alive then, we conclude that the rigidified description
does not denote anyone relative to that time. (Of course, the wide-scope reading
is the one on which the tensed sentence is true.)
Taking Premise 1 for granted, let us compare the semantic behavior of a
proper name, e.g. ‘Hitler’, to the behavior of some actualized description it
might allegedly abbreviate, e.g. ‘The actual nazi dictator’. With respect to
worlds where Hitler exists, these designators converge: they will both refer to
their common actual referent, Hitler; yet, with respect to worlds where Hitler
does not exist, they diverge: the obstinate ‘Hitler’ will refer to Hitler, but the
persistent ‘The actual nazi dictator’ will refer to nothing. According to
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Premise 3, such differences in rigidity properties between names and rigidified
descriptions are supposed to entail differences in meaning between them. Now I
think we do not need to assume much about meaning or content in order to
establish Premise 3. Indeed, an argument for Premise 3 might run along the
following lines:
The Argument for Premise 3
Premise 3.1: Differences in rigidity properties between terms entail differences in
modal status between sentences containing them. Given rigid designators d and
d* such that d is obstinate and d* persistent, there will be sentences S and S*
containing them that differ in modal status, where S* differs from S only in
containing t* where S contains t; the modal status of a sentence consists in
properties of the sentence such as being true or being false at a given possible
world, being necessarily true, being contingently true, etc.
Premise 3.2: Differences in modal status entail differences in truth-conditions. If
S and S* differ in modal status, they will have different truth-conditions.
Premise 3.3: Differences in truth-conditions entail differences in content. If S
and S* differ in truth-conditions, they will differ in content.
The conclusion is, of course, Premise 3. To check Premise 3.1, notice that the
above differences in rigidity between a name like ‘Hitler’ and a description like
‘The actual nazi dictator’ yield in fact differences in modal status. Consider, for
example, the sentence
(8) Hitler is identical to Hitler.
It follows from the obstinacy thesis, together with the usual semantics for
identity sentences, that (8) is necessarily true; in particular, it is true at a
counterfactual situation w in which Hitler does not exist. Yet, assuming the
persistence of actualized descriptions, the sentence
(9) Hitler is the actual nazi dictator,
which results from (8) by substituting the actualized description for the name,
will be rated as not true at w. This will be the case on any semantic treatment of
atomic sentences containing improper descriptions. On some views (9) is false at
w, on others it lacks a truth-value at w; in any case, it will be not true at w. Thus,
(9) is not necessarily true.5 Using the modal idiom can make the same point. Let
n be a name and The actual F the associated rigidified description. Then,
whereas a sentence of the form n might not have been n has no true reading,
the corresponding sentence n might not have been the actual F has one true
reading (the wide-scope reading of the modal operator). Hence, given Premise
3.2 and the hardly disputable Premise 3.3, it follows that the noted differences in
rigidity between names and actualized descriptions entail differences in content
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between sentences of the forms S and S* in which they occur and so, given
compositionality, differences in meaning between the terms.
One way of challenging this argument is by rejecting the claim that differ-
ences in modal status entail differences in content, a claim that follows from
Premises 3.2 and 3.3; as a result, one of these premises should be dropped.
Stanley seems to reject something very much like that claim in recent papers
(Stanley 1997: 137–8, Stanley 1998: 374). He argues that the following pair of
sentences provides us with a clear counter-example:
(10) The President of the United States came for dinner
(11) The actual President of the United States came for dinner.
Indeed, there seems to be no discernible difference in assertoric content between
utterances of (10) and (11) in an appropriate context. Yet, they surely differ in
modal status on the basis of conspicuous differences in modal behavior between
the rigid description in (11) and the non-rigid description in (10); for example, a
world where Bush exists, Gore won the last election, and Bush did not come for
dinner but Gore did, is a world at which (11) is false and (10) true.
However, this argument is unimpressive. The modifier ‘actual’, as well as
cognates such as ‘actually’, is ambiguous between a sense in which it plays the
role of a mere device for emphasis, being semantically vacuous when used in that
sense, and a sense in which it plays the role of a world-indexed rigidifier. Of
course, when used in the latter sense the expression is far from being semantic-
ally vacuous, as witnessed by the fact that whenever s is a contingently true
sentence any biconditional of the form s iff actually, s is only contingently true.
The difference between these two senses is elegantly captured in David Lewis’s
example ‘If Fred ate more, he would actually be fatter than he actually is’, in
which the first occurrence of ‘actually’ is intended in the former sense and the
second in the latter sense. Now the sense of ‘actual’ that is relevant to back up
the intuition that sentences (10) and (11) have the same assertoric content seems
to be the sense in which the expression is in (11) semantically vacuous. But if this
is so then the description ‘The actual President of the United States’ will hardly
be a rigid designator, in which case no difference in modal status between (10)
and (11) is forthcoming. On the other hand, if ‘actual’ is taken in the sense of
a world-indexed rigidifier, there will be a difference in modal status indeed; but
there is no reason then to insist that the sentences have the same assertoric
content (in some pre-theoretical sense of the term).
Sed Contra Stanley argues that there is no difference in content between
utterances of (10) and (11) because this is a consequence of a general principle
about content called Frege’s Test. Roughly, Frege’s Test asserts that utterances
have the same content iff it is impossible for a speaker who understands them to
assent to one of them while not assenting to the other. Stanley contends that
even if ‘actually’ is read in (11) as a rigidifier, it is impossible for someone to
understand both sentences and assent to (10) but deny (11) (or vice-versa).
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Therefore, by Frege’s Test, (10) and (11) have the same assertoric content. I have
some doubts about this line of reasoning. First, it is not at all clear that the
right-to-left direction of Frege’s Test, the claim that sameness of cognitive
significance is sufficient for sameness of assertoric content, is a sound principle
about content. Of course, the left-to-right direction is obvious, for it is a
consequence of Leibniz’s Law; but what is required to run the argument is the
former claim not the latter. Second, even granting Frege’s Test, one could come
up with a variant of the modal argument against actualized descriptivism in
which a notion of meaning as that which is grasped by a competent speaker of
the language is employed in lieu of the notion of meaning as content (what-is-
said by a sentence in a context of use). Then one could argue that a speaker who
inter alia masters the semantics of the actuality operator could indeed be in a
position in which she would (in appropriate circumstances) e.g. assent to (10)
but deny (11).
When Stanley claims that (10) and (11) have the same assertoric content he
seems to be conflating this relation between sentences (or utterances) with
a different relation, a relation we might call ‘cognitive equivalence’. Say that
sentences s and s* are cognitively equivalent if the biconditional sentence s iff s*
is knowable a priori. Then, given the standard semantical treatment of the
actuality operator, (10) and (11) will be cognitively equivalent since the relevant
biconditional will be a logical truth and hence knowable a priori.6 Of course, it
does not follow that these sentences have the same assertoric content.
We finish by outlining an argument against actualized descriptivism that
connects differences in rigidity properties between terms (persistence versus
obstinacy) to differences in epistemic properties between sentences containing
them (a posteriority versus a prioririty). Consider pairs of sentences of the
following kind:
(Q) n is the F
(Q)* The actual F is the F.
Suppose that The actual F is the description allegedly associated by competent
speakers with a proper name n. Q and Q* only differ in that Q* contains the
obstinate n where Q contains the persistent The actual F. It can be argued that
instances of Q and instances of Q* will typically differ in epistemic modal status.
Instances of Q* will be a priori truths (although only contingently true): they
can be recognized as being true in the actual world solely on the basis of logic
and semantics (so as to speak); whereas instances of Q will clearly be a posteriori
truths. Assuming that such differences entail differences in meaning or content
(an assumption that can be challenged but whose discussion lies beyond the
scope of this paper), it follows that instances of Q and Q* will typically differ in
meaning. So, given compositionality, the meaning of a proper name n cannot be
the meaning of an actualised description The actual F. Notice that the argument
runs even if the description The F is itself persistently rigid, e.g. in the case of
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a pair of sentences such as ‘Socrates is the offspring of gametes s and o’ and ‘The
actual offspring of gametes s and o is the offspring of gametes s and o’.
Notes
1. Thanks to Tim Williamson for extensive comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. It has also benefited from comments by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and
Josep Macia.
2. One should note that this way of drawing the distinction between mediated
and unmediated rigid reference brings it close to Kripke’s distinction between
de facto and de jure rigidity (Kripke 1980: 21n).
3. Naturally, there is still the problem of vacuous names to be handled; but that
should be seen as a separate problem, requiring a separate treatment. Besides, it
seems to be a problem afflicting most current semantical accounts of proper
names.
4. Notice that in order to deal with the issue about temporal obstinacy we need not
take a stand on the surely important issue of whether there are past or future
objects, or whether these can be genuine objects of reference (especially the
latter); these issues are clearly independent and it is important to keep them
apart.
5. Of course, one could say that (9) is necessarily true in the weak sense, the sense
in which a sentence that is not false at any world is necessarily true; but (8) will
be necessarily true in the strong sense and so it will still differ from (9) in modal
status.
6. I have been assuming without any discussion Kaplan’s views on the a priori
status of biconditional sentences of the form s iff actually s.
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